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UNDERWRITER DUE DILIGENCE: "IT'S
[NOT] A WHOLE NEW BALLGAME."
Eric Seitz*
I. INTRODUCTION
N December 27, 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("Commission") gave many smaller public companies a late
Christmas present by announcing regulatory amendments that
make it easier for them to issue securities in a public offering. This an-
nouncement culminated twenty-five years of rapid change within securi-
ties-offering regulation. Many factors and forces have combined to
account for this change. Technological advances simultaneously have in-
creased the amount of information available to potential securities inves-
tors and decreased the time it takes to disseminate this information. The
efficient securities marketplace now reacts almost instantaneously to this
continual influx of information. As a result, the amount of time issuers
have to coordinate a securities offering with favorable market conditions
is constantly shortening.
Over the years, the Commission has responded to this trend by al-
lowing issuers to "incorporate by reference" certain registration docu-
ments as well as to file "shelf" registrations which they can "pull down"
on very short notice. Both options allow issuers to get properly regis-
tered offerings to the marketplace very quickly, which decreases the
chance that market conditions will change drastically during the registra-
tion process. Concurrent with these accelerated registration options,
competition between underwriters has become fiercely intense as the un-
derwriting industry has moved from a "relationship" to a "transactional"
model. This competition has squeezed both underwriters' margins as well
as the time they have to "get to know" a client.
These factors have created a "perfect storm" for underwriters. Securi-
ties issuers, who underwriters do not know as well as they used to, seek
increasingly shorter registration periods. Underwriters have less time to
conduct due diligence on securities offerings. In many ways, this both has
reduced the willingness and the ability of underwriters to conduct thor-
* J.D. Candidate 2008, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; B.S.
Business 1993, Miami, University. I would like to thank Marc I. Steinberg, Rupert and
Lillian Radford Professor of Law at Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law, for enlightening me as to this exciting and dynamic area of the law. In particular, his
class lectures served as an impetus for this topic and his textbook, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION, Fourth Edition, provided a foundation for this paper.
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ough due diligence investigations. Despite repeated admonitions from
industry and academia, the Commission has been slow to the rescue, only
going as far as suggesting that "underwriters may elect to apply somewhat
different, but equally thorough, investigatory practices."1 While several
of these practices are explored in this Comment, none have proven to be
particularly effective because the Commission refuses to "adapt the [due
diligence] standard to the circumstances of modem [securities] offer-
ings. '' 2 Due diligence standards for underwriters largely remain un-
changed from when they were enacted over seventy years ago. This
Comment examines the history and development of the securities regis-
tration/underwriting dichotomy, explores the problems that exist, and
suggests several solutions to realign underwriting requirements with the
realities of modern securities offerings.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the enactment of the Securities Act of 19333 ("Securities Act")
and the Securities Exchange Act of 19344 ("Exchange Act"), "the capital
markets were in complete disarray."' 5 "[H]alf of the $ 50 billion of new
securities offered during the decade following World War I [ultimately]
proved to be worthless."'6 "The flotation of such a mass of essentially
fraudulent securities was made possible because of the complete aban-
donment ... of ... standards of fair, honest, and prudent dealing .... 7
President Roosevelt called for legislation that would put "the burden of
telling the whole truth" on the seller.
8
Congress passed the Securities Act to ensure full disclosure and gov-
ernmental review of securities offerings and to provide civil liabilities for
material misstatements and omissions. 9 The Securities Act is simple and
narrowly focused, but provides a serviceable mechanism to ensure these
goals are met. 10 The Exchange Act was passed one year later for the
purpose of regulating securities markets, brokers, and dealers.11 Unlike
1. Circumstances Affecting the Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable In-
vestigation and Reasonable Grounds for Belief Under Section 11 of the Securities Act,
Securities Act Release No. 33-6335, 23 SEC Docket 401, 406 (Aug. 18, 1981) [hereinafter
Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable Investigation].
2. Joseph McLaughlin, Liability Implications of the SEC's Reform Proposals for Se-
curities Offerings, 37 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 147, 151 (Jan. 24, 2005).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006).
5. Edward F. Greene, Determining the Responsibilities of Underwriters Distributing
Securities Within an Integrated Disclosure System, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 767
(1981).
6. Joseph McLaughlin & William J. Williams, Jr., Report of Task Force on Sellers'
Due Diligence and Similar Defenses Under the Federal Securities Laws, 48 Bus. LAW. 1185,
1190 (1993) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933)).
7. Id.
8. Greene, supra note 5, at 767. Interestingly, essentially the same burden was placed
on the underwriter as well.
9. McLaughlin & Williams, supra note 6, at 1190.
10. Milton Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1340 (1966).
11. Id. at 1340-41.
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the Securities Act, which is applicable to a large number of companies
but only on relatively rare occasions, the Exchange Act affects a rela-
tively small number of companies on a regular basis, with considerably
fewer "supporting mechanisms and sanctions. 1 2
A. THE SECURITIES AcT OF 1933
Pursuant to the Securities Act, when a securities offering is issued by
means of interstate commerce or use of the mails (which almost is a cer-
tainty), it must be registered by means of a registration statement.1 3 The
purpose of the registration statement is two-fold: (1) to provide informa-
tion on the offering itself (e.g. underwriting and distribution arrange-
ments, offering price, costs, intended use of proceeds, etc.); and (2) to
provide information on the issuer's business (e.g. history, management,
property, material contracts, financial condition, etc.). 14 There are two
major exceptions to the registration requirement. 15 If securities are is-
sued via an exempted transaction, no registration is required. 16 Examples
of exempted transactions include those by "any person other than an is-
suer, underwriter, or dealer, ' 17 those not involving a public offering, I8 or
certain transactions by a dealer. 19 Moreover, certain classes of securities
are exempted from registration. 20 Examples include certain short-term
promissory notes, securities issued by local, state, or federal governmen-
tal entities, and securities issued by non-profit and charitable
organizations. 21
Registration is perfected by filing a registration statement with the
Commission, paying a registration fee, and making information contained
in the registration statement available to the public "under such regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe. '22 Generally, no securities can
be sold until a registration statement is "effective. '23 Unless the Com-
mission deems the registration statement to include inaccurate or incom-
plete information, the registration statement becomes effective twenty
12. Id. at 1341.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006).
14. Cohen, supra note 10, at 1344-45.
15. Such exceptions pertain to registration requirements promulgated under the Se-
curities Act only. Some securities fall under the supervisory and oversight umbrella of
other statutory regimes, including, for example, the Comptroller of the Currency, for se-
curities issued by national banks. See MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES
LAW 37 (4th ed. 2007).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2006).
17. Id. § 77d(1).
18. Id. § 77d(2).
19. Id. § 77d(3).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2006).
21. See STEINBERG, supra note 15, at 37.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a)-(d) (2006).
23. Id. § 77e(a). Issuers who have filed periodic reports under the Exchange Act for
at least twelve months and have a "public float" of at least $700 million-so called "well-
known seasoned issuers"-may sell securities prior to the effective date of the registration
statement. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 85 SEC
Docket 2871, 2882-85 (July 19, 2005).
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days after filing, or earlier as the Commission may determine. 24 While
the process of registering a securities offering is fairly straightforward, it
is far from a simple, ministerial endeavor. The registration statement is
complex and exhaustive, and can cost an issuer tens if not hundreds of
thousands of dollars to prepare. 25 Moreover, the time taken to complete
a registration statement is properly measured in weeks, not hours or
days.26 Such costs are financially prohibitive for many companies.
27
B. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
The Exchange Act established a "continuous disclosure system for issu-
ers of most of the important corporate securities traded in the nation's
markets."' 28 The regime requires these issuers to file an initial registra-
tion statement2 9 as well as periodic reports and proxy solicitations. 30 The
main difference, then, between the financial data available to the invest-
ing public under the Securities Act and under the Exchange Act relates
to the currency of the data. Reports under the Securities Act only are
accurate as to the date of the last securities offering, whereas Exchange
Act reports are updated at least partially on a quarterly basis and com-
pletely on an annual basis. 31 With the advent of integrated disclosure, the
Exchange Act came to play a major role in the registration and under-
writing process.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITIES
REGISTRATION PROCESS
A. INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE
The Securities and Exchange Acts operate independently, but their re-
spective disclosure requirements came to be viewed by issuers and under-
writers as somewhat duplicative and unnecessary. 32 For example, much
of the information required in Securities Act registration statements can
be found in Exchange Act reports. 33 In 1966, Commission-insider Milton
Cohen proffered that some sort of integrated disclosure was in order,
stating: "[It is my plea that there now be created a new coordinated dis-
closure system having as its basis the continuous disclosure system of the
1934 [Exchange] Act and treating '1933 [Securities] Act' disclosure needs
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (2006).
25. STEINBERG, supra note 15, at 38.
26. Herb Frerichs, Jr., Underwriter Due Diligence Within the Integrated Disclosure Sys-
tem-If It Isn't Broken, Don't Fix It, 16 SEc. REG. L.J. 386, 387 (1989).
27. See STEINBERG, supra note 15, at 38-39.
28. Cohen, supra note 10, at 1355.
29. Such a statement would include essentially the same information found in a Securi-
ties Act registration statement less any information pertaining to a particular offering. Id.
at 1356.
30. Id. at 1355-56.
31. Id. at 1356.
32. Frerichs, supra note 26, at 387.
33. Id.
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on this foundation. '34  Cohen proffered that the Commission add
"needed flesh" to the Exchange Act requirements and cut "unneeded
fat" from the Securities Act requirements, while recognizing that a bal-
ance must be struck between the view that "more disclosure ... [is] bet-
ter" and the concern over the significant cost of disclosure. 35
The Commission responded a year later by temporarily adopting
"short-form" registration, where issuers with a substantial history of filing
reports under the Exchange Act 36 could rely on certain information con-
tained in Exchange Act reports to satisfy certain Securities Act registra-
tion requirements. 37 While this was a positive step, it affected only a
small percentage of all reporting companies. 38 The Commission formally
adopted integrated disclosure in 1982, 39 stating that the goal of the system
was "to eliminate overlapping and unnecessary disclosure and dissemina-
tion requirements where possible, thereby reducing burdens on issuers,
while at the same time ensuring that the investing public was receiving
meaningful, nonduplicative information on which to base investment de-
cisions."' 40 Then-Commissioner John Shad declared the day "an historic
occasion. '41 The Commission's rationale for integrated disclosure
stemmed from the "efficient market hypothesis," which theorizes that the
securities markets are completely efficient and that "new information
about a security is almost instantaneously assimilated in the marketplace
and reflected in the security's price."'42 Accordingly, if an issuer has filed
periodic reports with the Commission, the information contained therein
automatically is incorporated in a security's price on behalf of potential
investors.43
Under the current integrated disclosure system, issuers are divided into
two tiers.44 Each tier determines what information must be included in
the registration statement and which information can be incorporated by
reference from periodic reports.45 Regardless of the origin, each issuer
34. Cohen, supra note 10, at 1342.
35. Id. at 1367.
36. Greene, supra note 5, at 782.
37. Lynn Nicholas, The Integrated Disclosure System and Its Impact Upon Underwrit-
ers' Due Diligence: Will Investors Be Protected?, 11 SEC. REG. L. 3, 4 n.2 (1983).
38. See id.
39. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, 24
SEC Docket 1262, 1262 (Mar. 3, 1982).
40. Frerichs, supra note 26, at 388.
41. Nicholas, supra note 37, at 4-5.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id. In one regard, market efficiency has a negative, rather than positive, effect on
the quality of information that is assimilated into the price of securities. Because of the
instant availability of information via the Internet, underwriters have a more difficult time
"scrubbing" information upon which investors ultimately should rely. Additionally, under-
writers have no control over the dissemination of relevant, if not entirely correct, informa-
tion upon which investors may unwittingly rely. See Craig Chapman, Underwriters' Due
Diligence Revisited, 35 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 207, 209 (2002).




"makes available" the same information-whether it be found in the re-
gistration statement or periodic reports.
46
B. SHELF REGISTRATION
On December 31, 1983, the Commission permanently adopted "shelf
registration" via the Securities Act Rule 415.47 Rule 415 allows a quali-
fied issuer to register a securities offering and then sell the registered
securities either continuously or periodically during the ensuing three-
year period after the effective date of the registration statement.48 Each
time an issuer makes an offering, any material changes to the registration
information (whether contained in the registration statement or incorpo-
rated by reference from Exchange Act reports) that have occurred when
the securities are sold must be updated.
49
IV. THE UNDERWRITER
A. UNDERWRITER AS ADVERSARY AND ADVISOR
In a securities offering, the basic role of an underwriter is to act as an
intermediary between the issuer and the investor.50 For a portion of the
proceeds of the sale of securities, an underwriter assumes the responsibil-
ity and risk inherent in selling securities in a public offering.51 Such re-
sponsibility requires an underwriter to "exercise a high degree of care in
investigation and independent verification of the company's representa-
tions"5 2 and to ensure the truth of registration statements and prospec-
tuses.5 3 In this regard, the position of the underwriter and the issuer are
adverse. 54 Underwriters are expected to uncover exaggerations and
overly optimistic statements made by issuers. 55 "The underwriter must
question, probe, investigate, verify-play 'devil's advocate' with the is-
suer." 56 The Feit court summarized the important, while tenuous, role of
underwriters when it stated:
[C]ourts must be particularly scrupulous in examining the conduct of
underwriters since they are supposed to assume an opposing posture
with respect to management .... In light of this adverse position they
must be expected to be alert to exaggerations and rosy outlooks and
chary of all assurances by the issuer. Their duty is to the investing
46. Id.
47. Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 29 SEC Docket 138, 138(Nov. 17, 1983).
48. Id. See also Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.415 (2008).
49. Frerichs, supra note 26, at 390-91.
50. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
51. Id.
52. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 582 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
53. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
54. Id. at 696.
55. Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 581.
56. Nicholas, supra note 37, at 10.
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public under Section 11 as well as to their own their own self-interest
and that duty cannot be taken lightly.57
Given the short amount of time an underwriter has to respond to any
problems that are uncovered during the due diligence process, often the
underwriter's only recourse is to refuse to "close" an offering.58 In this
regard, an underwriter wields tremendous power. An underwriter rarely
uses this arrow in its quiver, however, because of the competitive envi-
ronment in which underwriters operate. As a result, most will move for-
ward in all but the most serious instances of disclosure problems.59
The underwriter has interests aligned with the issuer as well. The un-
derwriter assists the issuer in pricing the offering and structuring financ-
ing.60 Because of the invaluable services an underwriter provides to both
the issuer and the investing public, the role traditionally has been revered
as instrumental in the proper and efficient functioning of the securities
markets.61 As the Second Circuit noted:
No greater reliance in our self-regulatory system is placed on any
single participant in the issuance of securities than upon the under-
writer. He is most heavily relied upon to verify published materials
because of his expertise in appraising the securities issue and the is-
suer, and because of his incentive to do so. He is familiar with the
process of investigating the business condition of a company and
possesses extensive resources for doing so. Since he often has a fi-
nancial stake in the issue, he has a special motive [to] thoroughly...
investigate the issuer's strengths and weaknesses. Prospective inves-
tors look to the underwriter . . . to pass on the soundness of the
security and the correctness of the registration statement and
prospectus. 62
Several permutations of the issuer-underwriter relationship exist that
merit noting. In a "firm commitment" arrangement, the underwriter
agrees to purchase all or most of the securities offered and assumes the
duty (and accompanying risk) of selling the securities to the public. 63 By
contrast, a "best efforts" arrangement only requires the underwriter to
act as an agent of the issuer and diligently attempt to sell the securities. 64
The risk of loss remains with the issuer.65
Two types of distribution arrangements exist within the underwriting
industry: the "negotiated" approach and the "competitive bidding" ap-
proach.66 With the negotiated approach, the "rules of engagement" be-
57. Feit, 332 F. Supp at 581.
58. Interests of Named Experts and Counsel, 17 C.F.R. § 229.509 (2008).
59. Id.
60. Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Release No. 34-26100, 41 SEC Docket
1131, 1144 (Sept. 22, 1988).
61. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir. 1973).
62. Id.






tween the issuer and underwriter generally are contemplated and agreed
upon after a series of meetings. 67 The underwriter determines if any
other underwriters will be brought into the deal-but only after an agree-
ment first has been struck with the issuer.68 If a consortium of underwrit-
ers is formed (a "purchase group"), the firm that negotiated with the
issuer becomes the "managing underwriter" and charges a fee for its ser-
vices.69 The managing underwriter then is responsible for executing a
separate underwriting agreement on the purchase group's behalf.70 In
the "competitive bidding" environment, underwriters form purchase
groups before any issuer is identified and then bid on an offering once it
is announced. 71 The group that wins the bid then decides on the offering
price, method of sale, etc. 72 Another key difference between these two
distribution arrangements is the timing of the underwriter's due diligence.
While due diligence responsibilities and expectations remain the same,
the time in which to complete them can drastically be different. With
negotiated arrangements, the underwriter and the issuer work together to
prepare the registration material.73 Under a competitive bidding scena-
rio, the underwriter is engaged much later in the process and typically
relies on underwriter's counsel to begin due diligence.74
B. UNDERWRITER As GATEKEEPER
The role of a gatekeeper is defined as an "intermediar[y] who pro-
vide[s] verification and certification services to investors by pledging [its]
professional reputation[] and[] by withholding ...support, block[ing]
admission through the gate."' 75 The strategy of gatekeeping is a device
for utilizing third parties in an enforcement effort against private actors in
the public marketplace. 76 The enforcement sought is achieved through
the passive refusal of support of the third party.77 In the securities set-
ting, the term "gatekeeper" long has been used to describe independent
professionals who indirectly serve the investing public by preparing, scru-
tinizing, and vouching for the accuracy of information they receive.78 Ex-
67. Id.
68. Id. The underwriter determines if it wants to allocate some of its risk by bringing
in additional underwriters.
69. Id. at 763. Generally, the lead underwriter performs the majority of the due dili-
gence functions on behalf of the underwriting syndicate. See Gretchen Morgenson,
WorldCom Teaches a Pricey Lesson, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, § 3, at 1.
70. Greene, supra note 5, at 763.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 764.
74. Id.
75. Lawrence Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92
MINN. L. REV. 323, 328 (2007).
76. Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strat-
egy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986).
77. Id. at 54.
78. John Coffee, The Attorney As Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1293, 1296 (2003).
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amples of gatekeepers include auditors, debt rating agencies, securities
analysts, underwriter's counsel, and underwriters themselves. 79
The "accountability" theory behind the effectiveness of a gatekeeper is
that a party independent of the issuer is positioned so that if it withholds
consent or approval, the issuer may be unable to move forward in some
desired manner. 80 At the same time, the gatekeeper is insulated to the
point that it will receive little or nothing from corporate misconduct.8 '
Thus, a gatekeeper will not be tempted to engage in or consent to crimi-
nal activity in order to achieve a particular result or status.82 Of major
value to a gatekeeper is its reputation for thoroughness, fairness, and im-
partiality. The theory postulates that a gatekeeper will not risk the value
of its reputation to further the goals of any client, especially one that
represents a relatively small portion of its revenues. 83 Gatekeepers are
less likely to acquiesce to fraud if they are more likely to be "repeat
players." 84
As the role of underwriters transformed from a relationship model to a
transactional model (where a smaller percentage of a firm's revenue gen-
erally came from any individual issuer), underwriters fell neatly into the
gatekeeping role. However, this development has turned out to be tenu-
ous. For example, the indiscretions of Arthur Anderson, a quintessential
gatekeeper, and the resulting collapse of Enron, left in its wake a serious
blow to the reputation of many "well-established intermediaries," includ-
ing underwriters. 85 As a result, preservation of reputation as motivation
to perform the gatekeeping role seriously was undermined.
V. MAJOR SOURCES OF UNDERWRITER LIABILITY
Congress views underwriters as bearing a "moral responsibility to the
public [that] is particularly heavy."86 As a result, legislation governing
the accountability of underwriters has been "designed to assure compli-
ance with the disclosure provisions ... by imposing a stringent standard
of liability on the parties who play a direct role in a registered offering."'87
Major sources of underwriter liability can be found in Sections 11 and 12
of the Securities Act and Section 10 of the Exchange Act. Liability also
can accrue under common law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
principles.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1295.
81. Id. at 1298.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1297-98.
84. Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict
Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 501 (2001).
85. Jonathan Barnett, Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional
Curiosities, 33 J. CORP. L. 95, 102 (2007).
86. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 581 (1995).
87. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1983).
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A. SECURITIES ACT SECTION 11
Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes liability "[i]n case any part of
the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading" on "every underwriter with respect to such security. '88
Whether a statement or omission is "material" is a question of fact based
on whether a "reasonable investor" would find the information signifi-
cant.89 A misstatement or omission may be deemed immaterial if it is
trivial, already well-known in the marketplace, or accompanied by cau-
tionary language. 90 The thrust of the protection Section 11 provides
stems from its potential effect on the issuer, underwriters, and other par-
ties. 91 As Milton Cohen boasted, "[t]he liability provisions have had the
in terrorem effect of creating an extraordinarily high sense of care and
responsibility in the preparation of registration statements. '92
B. SECURITIES ACT SECTION 12(A)(2)
Section 12(a)(2) imposes liability on "any person who offers or sells a
security . . by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which in-
cludes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements . . . not misleading." 93
Thus, in a "firm commitment" underwriting arrangement, the under-
writer (as the seller of securities) can be liable under Section 12. 94 Pursu-
ant to Securities Act Rule 159, only information conveyed to investors up
to and at the time of sale will be examined for Section 12 purposes. 95
C. EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 10(B) 9 6
While Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act essentially impose a neg-
ligence standard on underwriters, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act im-
poses liability for using or employing "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
88. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (2006). Note that Section 11 does not apply to oral commu-
nications or preliminary prospectuses.
89. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 657-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
90. Id. at 658.
91. Nicholas, supra note 37, at 8.
92. Cohen, supra note 10, at 1355.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006). The "materiality" standard required under a Section
12(a)(2) cause of action is identical to that under Section 11. See WorldCom, 346 F. Supp.
2d at 658 n.38.
94. See Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzky's Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir.
2001); WorldCom, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
95. See Valerie Jacob, The Due Diligence Process From the Underwriter's Perspective,
1606 PLI/CoRP. 35, 40-41 (2007).
96. For the purposes of this Comment, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder are treated analogously.
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may prescribe. . .. "97 In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,98 a federal
court found an implicit private right of action under Section 10(b). 99 To
successfully make a claim under Section 10(b), a plaintiff must establish
(1) a misstatement or omission; (2) of material fact; (3) made with scien-
ter;100 (4) on which the plaintiff relied; 10 1 and (5) that proximately caused
his injury. 10 2 While Section 10(b) provides no affirmative due diligence
defense akin to that provided under Section 11 or Section 12, it is "virtu-
ally impossible" to find that an underwriter who invokes an effective Sec-
tion 11 or Section 12 due diligence defense possessed the scienter
required under Section 10(b). 10 3
Paramount to an underwriter's potential liability under Section 10(b) is
the question of aiding and abetting liability. After nearly six decades of
speculation and uncertainty, the Supreme Court finally held in 1994 that
no private right of action exists under Section 10(b) for aiding and abet-
ting securities fraud, and secondary actors are not subject to liability.'0 4
However, a seemingly secondary actor can be deemed primary-and thus
liable under a Section 10(b) private action-if he "employs a manipula-
tive device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies.. . assuming all of the requirements
for primary liability under [Exchange Act] Rule lOb-5 are met. °10 5 This
somewhat circular reasoning-"a secondary actor might be liable as a pri-
mary actor"-has caused a split in the circuits concerning ultimate secon-
dary actor liability in fraud cases. 10 6
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2006).
98. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
99. Id. at 802.
100. For many years, ambiguity existed concerning the scienter requirement of Section
10(b). See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 584
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). The Public Securities Law Reform Act of 1995 requires that scienter be
pleaded "with particularity." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). Moreover, the Supreme
Court recently has clarified the requirement somewhat when it indicated the need for a
plaintiff to prove "a strong inference of scienter" to uphold a Section 10(b) claim, signaling
a tightening of the pleading requirements. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127
S. Ct. 2499, 2508-09 (2007).
101. In the instance of a material omission, reliance is established if a "reasonable in-
vestor" would have considered the withheld information to be important in making an
investment decision. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 374
(2d Cir. 1973). In the instance of a material misstatement, causation can be established
through the "fraud on the market theory ... hypothes[izing] that, in an open and devel-
oped securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available mate-
rial information regarding the company and its business ... " Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-1161 (3d Cir. 1986)).
102. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1116 (5th Cir. 1988).
103. McLaughlin & Williams, supra note 6, at 1189 n.14.
104. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994).
The Court left open the possibility of aiding and abetting liability under actions brought by
the government. This right of action was affirmed by the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act in 1995. See Joseph Morrissey, Catching the Culprits: Is Sarbanes-Oxley
Enough?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 801, 804 (2003).
105. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
106. Morrissey, supra note 104, at 804.
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Some circuits utilize a "bright-line" test, holding that an actor is "pri-
mary" only if he is identified to the investor as an author of the fraudu-
lent statement at issue, reasoning that absent an investor's knowledge of
the actors involvement, there can be no reliance. 10 7 Other circuits apply
the "substantial participation" rule, under which an actor can be deemed
"primary" if he substantially is involved in committing the fraud, regard-
less of whether his participation is formally announced to investors. 10 8
The reliance element is satisfied if there was reliance on the misstatement
itself. 109
D. CONGRESSIONAL ACTS AFFECTING UNDERWRITER LIABILITY
1. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act & The Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act
The threat of liability under the Securities and Exchange Acts was sig-
nificantly reduced with the passing of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995110 ("PSLRA") and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998111 ("SLUSA")." 2 The PSLRA instituted a stay on
discovery pending a motion to dismiss, while at the same time requiring
plaintiffs to plead scienter in 10(b) actions with particularity.' 1 3 Addi-
tionally, it provided a safe harbor for forward-looking statements that
were accompanied by appropriate cautionary language.' 14 Moreover, the
SLUSA preempted the majority of state-law securities fraud claims by
requiring class actions involving securities traded in interstate commerce
to be brought in federal court. 115 "The combined effect of the PSLRA
and the SLUSA was to make it much less likely for a plaintiff to prevail in
a securities fraud claim anywhere in the United States.'
1 6
2. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
After the financial implosion of several high profile companies such as
Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco cost the U.S. securities markets billions of
dollars,11 7 Congress enacted "the most sweeping and comprehensive
overhaul of federal corporate governance since the securities laws of 1933
107. Id. at 820-21.
108. Id. at 821.
109. Id. The Commission has indicated its support for the "substantial participation"
rule. Id. at 825.
110. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18
U.S.C.).
111. Pub. L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
112. See Morrissey, supra note 104, at 825-26.
113. Id. at 804.
114. Id. at 834.
115. Id. at 804.
116. Id. at 804-05.
117. Id. at 805-06. The resulting loss of confidence in the U.S. securities markets ulti-
mately caused investors to pull out $18 billion in June of 2002, the third largest withdrawal
in history. Id. at 806.
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and 1934" by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX").118 The
purpose of the legislation was to restore confidence in the integrity of the
securities markets, to restore them to a "model of transparent capital-
ism," 119 and to provide Congress with an opportunity to address and clar-
ify the defendant-friendly anti-fraud provisions of the PSLRA and the
SLUSA.12 0 As enacted, however, SOX seeks to maintain integrity in the
securities markets by regulating accountability on the part of corporate
insiders rather than by removing barriers to litigation.12
SOX requires Exchange Act reporting companies and issuers who have
filed registration statements 122 to, inter alia, establish independent "audit
committees" for the purposes of overseeing auditing processes and proce-
dures and ensuring the integrity of the company's financial informa-
tion.12 3 SOX also requires that both the CEO and the CFO of Exchange
Act reporting companies personally certify the fairness and accuracy of
the company's financial disclosures as well as acknowledge responsibility
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls throughout the or-
ganization. 12 4 Moreover, pursuant to Section 307, the Act requires attor-
neys who practice before the Commission to report any evidence of
securities laws violations "up" to the general counsel, chief executive of-
ficer, or board of directors. 125 Failure to do so can preclude the attorney
from practicing securities law. 126
VI. THE DUE DILIGENCE DEFENSE
Under both Securities Act Sections 11 and 12, an underwriter may ab-
solve itself of liability by establishing an affirmative "due diligence" de-
fense.12 7 To properly invoke this defense, Section 11 requires that an
underwriter prove "after reasonable investigation, [it had] reasonable
ground to believe and did believe . . . that the statements therein were
true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mislead-
ing."'128 Similarly, Section 12 requires that an underwriter show it "did
118. Scott Harshbarger & Goutam v. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward:
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 1, 3 (2007).
See Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
119. Morrissey, supra note 104, at 836-37.
120. Id. at 807.
121. Id. at 836-37. SOX does, however, aid plaintiffs by extending the statute of limita-
tions for private securities fraud claims to two years after discovery or five years after the
violation occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. V. 2005).
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 7201(7) (2006).
123. STEINBERG, supra note 15, at 145-46.
124. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006); see also Morrissey, supra note 104, at 844-45.
126. Morrissey, supra note 104, at 845.
127. In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1994).
128. Id. (citations omitted). For expertised (i.e. audited) portions of the registration
statement, the underwriter need only prove he had "no reasonable ground to believe and
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not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known,
of [the] untruth or omission.' 29 The "reasonable investigation" standard
of Section 11 and "reasonable care" standard of Section 12 are analyzed
in the same way,130 and the appropriate standard of care is that of a "pru-
dent man in the management of his own property.' 13' Thus, due dili-
gence is essentially a negligence standard.132
While underwriters are not expected to possess the same level of "inti-
mate" knowledge of a company's operations as the issuer, "[n]evertheless
they are expected to exercise a high degree of care in investigation and
independent verification of the company's representations."'' 33 What is
expected of an underwriter to satisfy a due diligence standard that lies
somewhere between a "high degree of care" and "intimate knowledge"
has led to confusion and uncertainty for underwriters. The Northern Dis-
trict of California attempted to clarify as follows:
After reviewing the record, this court concludes ... that the under-
writers did meet the standards required of them by section 11....
Their investigation ... was conducted by experienced people, who
were assisted by attorneys and accountants. The underwriters re-
viewed the industry, the company, the company's management, and
the company's past and projected manufacturing, sales and financial
performance. The underwriters had over twenty meetings with vari-
ous management personnel, covering all aspects of the company's
business. Company personnel were specifically questioned about the
development and scheduled availability of products, related operat-
ing systems and applications software. The underwriters also con-
tacted many . .. suppliers, customers and distributors, who were
asked extensive questions about the company's operations. The un-
derwriters reviewed company documents including operating plans,
product literature, corporate records, financial statements, contracts,
and lists of distributors and customers. They examined trade jour-
nals and other industry-related publications to ascertain industry
trends, market trends and competitive information. They also made
physical inspections of the company's facilities. When any negative
or questionable information was developed as a result of their inves-
tigation, the underwriters discussed it with the appropriate persons
and arrived at informed decisions and opinions. The underwriters
also obtained written representations from the selling stockholders
did not believe" that the expertised portion was materially false or misleading. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(k) (2006).
129. Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d at 621 (citation omitted).
130. Id.
131. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). This issue
was brought before the Supreme Court in John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, where the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari was denied. 450 U.S. 1005, 1005 (1981). However, Justices
Powell and Rehnquist dissented and would have granted certiorari, believing that by defi-
nition "reasonable investigation" was a higher standard than "reasonable care." Nuveen,
450 U.S. at 1008-09 (Powell, J., dissenting).
132. Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d at 621 (citation omitted).
133. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 582 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
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and the company that as of the closing date of the public offering,
there were no misstatements or omissions.
As a result of that investigation and due diligence, the underwrit-
ers reasonably believed the accuracy of the information contained in
the prospectus, including the information alleged to be misrepre-
sented or omitted here. The underwriters had no knowledge of any
misrepresentations or omissions, and their work met the standard of
the due diligence and reasonable investigation required by [section]
11 134
Even if a reasonable investigation would not uncover material misstate-
ments or omissions, an underwriter will prevail on the due diligence de-
fense only if such a futile investigation was made. 135
An underwriter's duty of investigation is not as stringent for "exper-
tised" portions of the registration statement, such as audited financial re-
ports. The seminal case of Escott v. BarChris Construction
Corporation36 explained that an underwriter meets his due diligence re-
quirement with respect to expertised portions of a registration statement
if he "had no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe that there
were any untrue statements or material omissions .... -137 Nevertheless,
confusion and uncertainty exist for underwriters here as well. The stan-
dard requires more than a cursory glance at expertised material, and may
"encompass[ ] many modes of inquiry between obtaining comfort letters
from an auditor and doing little more, on one hand, and having to re-
audit a company's books on the other."'138 If "aggressive or unusual"
procedures or information come to light, an underwriter may need to
consult with its own experts regarding the expertised information in ques-
tion to satisfy the elements of due diligence.139
The cost to underwriters-and ultimately to the investing public whom
they protect-of uncertainty in terms of standard of care can be stagger-
ing. A good example lies in the rash of settlements that occurred after
the WorldCom collapse in 2002. Citigroup agreed to pay $2.575 billion,
J.P. Morgan settled for $2 billion, and Bank of America settled for $460.5
million. 140 Another four investment banks-Lehman Brothers, Credit
Suisse, Goldman Sachs, and UBS Warburg-settled for approximately
$100 million.14' These firms settled in response to fraud allegations re-
134. Weinberger v. Jackson [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,693 at 98, 255 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1990).
135. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
136. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
137. Id. at 683.
138. WorldCom, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
139. Id.
140. Laurie Cohen & Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan's $630 Million Error, WALL ST. J., Mar.
25, 2005, at C1.
141. Chad Bray, Moving the Market: Four Banks to Pay $100 Million To Settle
WorldCom Inquiry, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 7, 2005, at C3.
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lated to the sale of WorldCom bonds levied against the underwriters
under Sections 11 and 12.142
VII. THE EVOLUTION OF DUE DILIGENCE
A. THE EFFECT OF INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE & SHELF
REGISTRATION ON DUE DILIGENCE
Traditionally, the preparation of a registration statement and accompa-
nying prospectuses took place over a relatively long period of time, com-
mencing several weeks or months before an anticipated securities
offering. 143 This generally provided underwriters with adequate time to
properly complete their due diligence activities prior to the filing of the
registration statement. 144 With the advent of integrated and short-form
registration, registration statements rely on information contained in re-
ports that have already been filed with the Commission per Exchange
Act periodic reporting requirements. 145 The underwriter merely reviews
the information to be incorporated and does not participate in the draft-
ing of the documents. 146 Normally, the only "new" information con-
tained in the registration statement pertains to details about the offering
itself, the use of the proceeds, and any necessary updates on incorporated
information. 147 As a result, preparation time significantly is reduced,
which necessarily reduces the time an underwriter has to perform neces-
sary due diligence activities. 1
48
Moreover, time constraints notwithstanding, much of the information
contained in the registration statement-whether in the statement itself
or by incorporation-is written without any involvement by an under-
writer whatsoever. 149 The underwriter nevertheless may be held to a
higher standard of care regarding the veracity of the information than the
party who writes or provides it. 150 Assuming, arguendo, that the informa-
tion was correct to begin with, there is always the possibility that time
142. Id. The settlements came after the investment banks lost their motion for sum-
mary judgment argument concerning reliance on the work-product of experts. See infra
notes 244-46.
143. Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable Investigation, supra note 1, at 403.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Chapman, supra note 43, at 209. According to Chapman, the "incorporation" pro-
cess is not as effective as the "review" process for two reasons. First, the issuer will gener-
ally resist amending public documents, especially when such an amendment is not required
but nevertheless would be beneficial to investors. Second, the "give and take" process of
drafting is an important exercise to strike a balance between issuer optimism and under-
writer prudence.
147. Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable Investigation, supra note 1, at 403.
148. This time constriction is exacerbated-perhaps even exponentially-the shorter
the time frame is between the decision to issue securities and the offering date.
149. Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable Investigation, supra note 1, at 403.
150. For example, an attorney who drafts portions of a registration statement is typi-
cally not liable for material misrepresentations or omissions therein, except for matters




renders some of the information inaccurate-for which the underwriter
becomes liable. 151
For over twenty years, the Securities Industry Association, leading in-
vestment banks, and law firms repeatedly have articulated to the Com-
mission their concerns over these effects. 152 Sullivan and Cromwell
commented that "in the ease and speed of offerings, integrated disclosure
may have countervailing costs in what may be expected of underwrit-
ers. '' 153 The Bar of the City of New York intimated that "[it is unrealistic
to expect underwriters to conduct the same type of due diligence investi-
gation as they are able to undertake when they participate in the prepara-
tion of a long-form registration statement." 154 Merrill Lynch warned that
"all of these factors lead to the conclusion that underwriters are simply
not able to perform the type of investigation envisioned by the
Commission." 55
Despite these concerns and a call to relax underwriter due diligence
requirements, the Commission has not acquiesced, "specifically re-
ject[ing] the suggestion that the underwriter needs only to read the incor-
porated materials and discuss them with representatives of the registrant
and named experts. Because the registrant would be the sole source of
virtually all information, this approach would not ... include the element
of verification required .... ,156 With regard to time constraints, the
Commission has noted that the underwriter is "never compelled to pro-
ceed with an offering until he has accomplished his due diligence. '157 "In
sum, the Commission strongly affirms the need for due diligence and its
attendant vigilance and verification." 158 Indeed, as late as 1998, the Com-
mission reaffirmed its express rejection of the consideration of competi-
tive timing and pressures when evaluating an underwriter's due diligence
efforts. 59
The securities community's fears have not been assuaged. Many be-
lieve that integrated disclosure seriously undermines underwriter due dil-
igence efforts because (1) underwriters normally do not participate in the
drafting of disclosures incorporated by reference; (2) they probably will
not have much success persuading issuers to change information in such
disclosures; (3) they have limited time in which to conduct due diligence;
and (4) they face increasing competition from other underwriters. 160
Many in the industry think the integrated disclosure system has "ren-
151. Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable Investigation, supra note 1, at 403.
152. Nicholas, supra note 37, at 27-28.
153. Id. at 28.
154. Id. (citing Association of the Bar of the City of New York letter of comment,
proposed forms A, B. and C, at 26 (Jan. 14, 1981) (File No. S7-849)).
155. Nichols, supra note 37, at 29.
156. Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable Investigation, supra note 1, at 406.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).




dered untenable the underwriter's traditional role and responsibilities in
securities distributions."'' 6
1
Shelf registration provided by Rule 415 merely has exacerbated the sit-
uation. Shelf registration is attractive because of the flexibility it provides
to issuers in properly "timing" increasingly volatile markets, and issuers
generally are anxious to pull an offering "off the shelf" quickly, leaving
the chosen underwriter little time to perform due diligence without rais-
ing the ire of its client.1
62
The Commission also changed certain internal procedures designed to
"curtail time in registration" and speed the time to market securities of-
ferings. 163 First, it began to review registration information based on one
of three levels, "cursory," "summary," or "customary"; then it further
condensed its oversight to two levels, "full review" and no review at
all. 164 Under this protocol, short-form registration statements are rarely
reviewed. 165 The absence of review removes another opportunity under-
writers traditionally had to perform due diligence-the time spent wait-
ing for the Commission staff to issue comments subsequent to review of
the registration statement.1 66 Furthermore, the Commission sped up the
"acceleration" of the effective date of registration statements, permitting
short-form integrated disclosure statements to become effective within
forty-eight hours after filing.167 Again, the effect has been to reduce the
time underwriters have to perform due diligence.
B. THE COMMISSION RESPONDS THROUGH RULEMAKING
The Commission finally acknowledged and addressed "anticipatory
and continuous due diligence programs"'16 in 1981 and promulgated Se-
curities Act Rule 176 to "identify certain of the circumstances bearing
upon the reasonableness of the investigation and the determination of
what constitutes reasonable ground for belief under section 11(b) of the
Securities Act. '169 According to Rule 176, relevant circumstances to be
considered for underwriter due diligence include the "type of underwrit-
ing arrangement, the role of the particular person as an underwriter and
the availability of information with respect to the registrant."'1 70 Al-
161. Id. (quoting Greene, supra note 5, at 797).
162. Id. § 5.04[5].
163. Nicholas, supra note 37, at 20-21.
164. Id. at 20.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 20-21.
167. Id. at 21. Pursuant to Section 8(a) of the Securities Act, registration statements by
default become effective on the twentieth day after filing. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a)
(2006)). However, the Commission may "accelerate" this process if it deems the informa-
tion provided is adequate and accessible enough to do so. Nicholas, supra note 37, at 21.
168. Shelf Registration, supra note 47, at 143.
169. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, supra note 39, at 1295; see also In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
170. Circumstances Affecting the Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable In-
vestigation and Reasonable Grounds for Belief Under Section 11 of the Securities Act, 17
C.F.R. § 230.176 (2008).
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though the rule ostensibly provides minimal guidelines by which an un-
derwriter can gauge the appropriateness of its due diligence efforts, it
does not lessen the due diligence requirement on underwriters, nor does
it provide a safe harbor.171 The Commission merely "acknowledged that
different investigatory methods would be needed 'in view of the com-
pressed preparation time and the volatile nature of the capital mar-
kets."' 172 In 1998, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 176 to
expound on the guidance provided to underwriters. 173 Under the propo-
sal, the Commission set forth six factors that are indicative of proper un-
derwriter due diligence. These factors include:
1. "Whether the underwriter reviewed the registration statement
and conducted a reasonable inquiry ... that would cause a reasona-
ble person to question" the veracity of the registration statement;
2. whether the underwriter discussed the registration statement
with the relevant officers of the issuer who certified no material mis-
statements or omissions exist;
3. whether the underwriter received a Statement on Auditing
Standards;
4. whether the underwriter received a favorable opinion letter from
issuer's counsel;
5. whether the underwriter retained counsel that issued a favorable
opinion; and
6. whether the underwriter employed or consulted a research ana-
lyst that followed the issuer and the issuer industry for at least six
months prior to the commencement of the offering.174
The Commission recognized that all of the factors mentioned in the pro-
posal currently were being used by underwriters for "expedited offer-
ings." 1 75 Unfortunately, in 2005 the Commission decided not to adopt
the proposed revisions to Rule 176.176 The Commission recognized that
market forces would continue to dictate "alternative" due diligence exer-
cises, but was quick to point out that such alternatives needed to be
"equally thorough.' 77 Essentially, nothing was accomplished as a result
of the seven-year proposal period.
One of the alternatives contemplated by the Commission was the use
of "periodic due diligence sessions," where issuers hold meetings after the
re!ease of periodic reporting to provide prospective underwriters with an
opportunity to discuss the information contained therein, as well as to
171. WorldCom, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
172. Id.
173. STEINBERG, supra note 15, at 204 (discussing the Regulation of Securities Offer-
ings, Securities Act Release No. 33-1167A, 68 SEC Docket 1427, 1512 (Nov. 13, 1998)).
174. Regulation of Securities Offerings, supra note 173, at 1512.
175. Id. at 1513.
176. 17 J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT & LITIGATION UNDER
THE 1933 ACT 4:108 (2008).
177. Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable Investigation, supra note 1, at 406.
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explore business trends and financial developments. 178 Some issuers also
allow underwriters to schedule ad hoc meetings with company manage-
ment to discuss the same information. 179 Another alternative is the use
of "drafting sessions," where a prospective underwriter is invited to par-
ticipate in the preparation of disclosure documents before they are
filed. 180
The major disadvantage to underwriters with respect to each of these
practices, especially when used in conjunction with shelf registration, is
that they both require a significant amount of time and involvement on
the part of the underwriter, perhaps hundreds or thousands of hours, gen-
erally before a firm is chosen to underwrite an offering.18' Thus, a partici-
pating firm proceeds on the notion that it will be the highest bidder.
182
Typically, no such assurance exists. Another point that militates against
these solutions is that an issuer can-and often does-solicit bids from
underwriters with the intent of distributing securities on the same day.'
83
C. THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
UNDERWRITERS AND ISSUERS
The nature of the relationship between issuers and underwriters has
evolved from one founded on long-lasting personal relationships to a
fiercely competitive field where each underwriter is only "as good as his
last deal."' 184 Investment banking has changed from a "relationship" to a
"transactional" perspective. 185 Even after an underwriting announce-
ment is made, it has become commonplace for underwriters to continue
to vie for the issuer's business by putting together a "better deal. ' 186 The
"high ceremony of capitalism" has morphed into a series of "bargain-
basement brawls.' 87 Integrated disclosure and shelf registration, when
combined with an increasingly competitive underwriting environment,
"[do] not permit underwriters' due diligence to improve the disclosure on
which investors rely and puts more pressure on underwriters to limit their
due diligence to the minimum [levels] necessary to defend themselves
178. Shelf Registration, supra note 46, at 143. It has been suggested that an impor-
tant-if unintended-function of such meetings is to remind an issuer's officers and direc-
tors of their due diligence obligations as well. See ROBERT J. WILD, DESIGNING AN
EFFEcTIVE SECURITIES COMPLIANCE PROGRAM § 3.19 (2007).
179. Shelf Registration, supra note 47, at 143.
180. Id.




184. Nicholas, supra note 37, at 24.
185. McLaughlin & Williams, supra note 6, at 1186.
186. Nicholas, supra note 37, at 24.
187. McLaughlin & Williams, supra note 6, at 1186. The competition in which under-
writers engage has been described as "a diamond-crusted striptease." Alison Leigh
Cowan, Off The Shelf, Corporate Chicanery With a Page-Turning Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
11, 2002, § 3, at 5.
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against Securities Act liabilities. ' 188 The few innovations suggested by
the Commission largely have proven to be ineffective.
D. UNDERWRITER'S COUNSEL
Because many underwriters are unwilling (because of cost) or unable
(because of time) to participate in due diligence or drafting sessions, and
because competitive forces often bring underwriters to the due diligence
table "late in the game," issuers began appointing a single law firm to act
as "underwriter's counsel." Designating underwriter's counsel allows
continual access to the issuer on the (eventual) underwriter's behalf and
thus facilitates continuous due diligence such as formal due diligence in-
terviews and participation in document drafting. 189 It also assures con-
tinuity throughout the effective life of the shelf registration, which is
important if more than one underwriter is used during the period.190
"[T]he Commission believes [this] to be a sound practice because it pro-
vides for due diligence investigations to be performed continually
throughout the effectiveness of the shelf registration statement."'191
The role played by underwriter's counsel can be extensive and varied.
Generally, underwriter's counsel assumes the due diligence function of
ensuring the veracity and completeness of all registration material. 1 92
More specifically, underwriter's counsel may assist in the preparation and
execution of the agreements between the issuer and underwriter, meet
with accounting experts to review financial information required by the
Exchange Act, review any applicable blue sky laws to ensure compliance
thereof, examine registration material prior to final printing and filing,
and assist with post-filing duties, including preparing press releases, issu-
ing stock certificates, reviewing accounting "comfort letters," updating
prospectuses, and preparing newspaper and NASD quotations. 93 Since
the underwriter possesses the expertise-and ultimately assumes the risk
of liability-for performing due diligence on a securities offering, under-
writer's counsel's effectiveness is limited, however, during those times
when there is no client to serve. 194
Regardless of who chooses the underwriter's counsel, the client is the
underwriter. There is implicit but conflicting authority whether the secur-
ities laws impose a special duty on underwriter's counsel to non-clients
188. Chapman, supra note 43, at 210. For example, one common practice is for under-
writers to greatly expand risk factor disclosure to take advantage of the safe-harbor for
forward-looking statements under the PSLRA without a concomitant modification of the
relevant business or financial disclosures. Id.
189. See, e.g., id. at 209.
190. See McLaughlin & Williams, supra note 6, at 1221.
191. Shelf Registration, supra note 47, at 143.
192. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1124 (5th Cir. 1988).
193. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 233-38 (5th ed.
2002). Underwriting agreements include information specific to the offering itself (number
of shares to be offered, the offering price, and basic underwriting terms) as well as agree-
ments for the "selling group" which may include a consortium of underwriters. Id. at 234.
194. McLaughlin & Williams, supra note 6, at 1222.
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such as issuers. 195 According to the Fifth Circuit, such counsel would be
liable to other parties only if it prepares documents based explicitly on
the underwriter's counsel's opinion with the knowledge that the non-cli-
ent will rely on or benefit from the information. 196 However, there is an
earlier Northern District of Mississippi decision-neither discussed nor
cited in Abell' 97-holding that issuer's counsel "owed a special duty of
diligent investigation and disclosure."'1 98 The holdings arguably are rec-
oncilable based on the extent of counsel's fraudulent involvement in Felts
versus the relatively benign action in Abell.199
The effectiveness of utilizing underwriter's counsel as a solution to the
challenges imposed by short-form and shelf registration also is tempered
by money. The underwriter is responsible for paying the underwriter's
counsel's fees, including those incurred during the start-up of the shelf
facility.200 The significant fees involved, combined with the inevitable
squeeze on underwriting compensation resulting from increased competi-
tion, has led many underwriters to examine the role of underwriter's
counsel on an a la carte basis.20 1 Even a fundamental task such as exam-
ining a corporate minute book no longer is immune from cost-benefit
scrutiny.20 2
Professional responsibility issues can arise with regard to whom under-
writer's counsel is really serving. After all, frequently underwriter's
counsel is hired by the issuer and begins work on behalf of a yet-to-be-
named underwriter. 20 3 In such cases, underwriter's counsel needs to be
cognizant of and careful not to run afoul of the widely-adopted tenets of
proper client representation held in the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC"). 20 4 The MRPC widely
195. Compare Abell, 158 F.2d at 1132, with Felts v. Nat'l Account Sys. Ass'n, Inc., 469
F. Supp. 54, 68 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
196. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1132.
197. See id.
198. Felts, 469 F. Supp. at 68.
199. Lora C. Siegler, Annotation, Attorney's Liability for Nondisclosure or Misrepresen-
tation to Third-Party Nonclients in Private Civil Actions Under Federal Securities Laws, 112
A.L.R. FED. 141, 174 (1993).
200. McLaughlin & Williams, supra note 6, at 1221.
201. Id. at 1222.
202. Id. at 1222-23.
203. Lewis D. Lowenfels et al., Attorneys As Gatekeepers: SEC Actions Against Law-
yers in the Age of Sarbanes Oxley, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 877, 923-28 (describing SEC action
against underwriter's counsel who consented to entry of final judgment permanently en-
joining underwriter's counsel from violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and ordering underwriter's counsel to pay disgorgement in the
amount of $152,500 for, inter alia, failing to disclose a conflict of interest created when
underwriter's counsel entered into an agreement to share part of its fees with the issuer).
204. Only relevant duties to clients and conflict-of-interest applications of the MRPC
are explored for the purposes of this Comment. There exist a host of rules governing
duties to report fraudulent and illegal conduct, but they largely are mooted by the applica-
tion of Securities Act Sections 11 and 12 and Exchange Act Section 10(b), since the under-
writer's counsel's knowledge of illegal or fraudulent conduct by the issuer likely would give
rise to liability under these sections.
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have been used as the basis for state and federal regulation in the area of
professional responsibility.20 5
Receiving fees from an entity other than a client is not a per se viola-
tion of the MRPC.20 6 The MRPC require, however, that such an arrange-
ment creates "no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship, 2 0 7 that con-
fidential information pertaining to the client is protected, and that the
client consents to the fee-paying arrangement. 20 8 An interesting ques-
tion-and one that apparently has not been litigated-is how an under-
writer-client who has not yet been named can give such consent. Even if
underwriter's counsel is paid nothing until an underwriter is named, that
counsel has incurred expenses and accrued fees, leaving an underwriter
with little choice but to give retroactive informed consent if it hopes to
get the business from the issuer.
Conflicts of issues can arise under the MRPC where "there is a signifi-
cant risk that the representation of [a] client[ ] will be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. '20 9 A lawyer may represent
a client notwithstanding such a risk if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by
one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing.210
The same informed consent argument comes into play in this example as
well. Conflict-of-interest concerns are most acute in cases where the is-
suer is a current or former client of the underwriter's counsel. While such
an occasion does not necessarily preclude representation of an under-
writer by counsel, 21 1 it brings into play obvious concerns over confidenti-
ality of information. According to the MRPC, a lawyer "shall not" reveal
information relating to the representation of a current client without in-
formed consent of the client, 21 2 nor shall a lawyer "use information relat-
205. JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES &
STATUTES 3-4 (2006-2007 ed.).
206. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2007).
207. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f)(2) (2007). If counsel believes inde-
pendence of judgment will or could be materially limited, it may nevertheless proceed with
the arrangement by meeting the requirements of MRPC 1.7(b), infra note 210.
208. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (f)(1)-(3).
209. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (emphasis added).
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4).
211. The requirements of MRPC 1.7(b) would apply in this instance as well. See id.
212. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).
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ing to the representation to the disadvantage of [a] former client except
as [the MRPC] would permit. ' 213 It is unlikely that the issuer would give
informed consent to underwriter's counsel to share negative-and poten-
tially "issue-stalling"-information with an underwriter. In any event, if
counsel has worked with an issuer before on any securities-related mat-
ter, it must get the issuer's informed consent before representing a poten-
tially adverse underwriter. 214
Although the mores of legal professional conduct do not prohibit prop-
erly informed "cohabitation" between issuer, underwriter, and under-
writer's counsel, disclosure requirements to the investing public exist that
condition the relationship as well. For example, any underwriter's coun-
sel who performs services on a contingent basis or will be given a security
interest greater than $50,000 in the issuer in connection with the offering
is required to "furnish a brief statement of the nature of such contingent
basis, interest, or connection. '215
E. SARBANES-OXLEY
In light of this legislation, underwriters now should review disclosures
submitted by the CEO and CFO under Sections 302 and 906, as well as
discuss with the CEO and CFO the company's internal controls over dis-
closure. Moreover, the underwriter should meet with the audit commit-
tee to discuss and explore its effectiveness in ensuring accurate financial
information and proper internal controls.216
VIII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On December 19, 2007, in an effort to "allow a larger number of public
companies to benefit from the greater flexibility and efficiency in assess-
ing the public securities markets . .. in a manner that is consistent with
investor protection," the Commission announced amendments to certain
registration eligibility requirements, making short-form and shelf regis-
tration accessible to a larger number of companies. 217 The amendments
primarily relate to Form S-3 ("short-form") registration, which is used by
eligible companies to incorporate Exchange Act reports into Securities
Act registration requirements. 218 Prior to the amendments, a company
was eligible to utilize short-form registration only if their non-affiliate eq-
uity market capitalization ("public float") was equal to or greater than
$75 million.219
213. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c)(1).
214. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(b)(1)-(2). In cases where the issuer
chooses the underwriter's counsel, presumably this would present little problem.
215. Interests of Named Experts and Counsel, 17 C.F.R. § 229.509 (2008).
216. Jacob, supra note 95, at 52-53.
217. Revision to the Eligibility Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings on
Forms S-3 and F-3, Securities Act Release No. 33-8878, 92 SEC Docket 513, 515 (2007).
218. Id. Eligibility to utilize Form S-3 also enables an issuer to utilize shelf registration.
219. Id.
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In April of 2006, the Commission Advisory. Committee on Smaller
Public Companies ("Committee") recommended that the criteria be loos-
ened so a greater number of companies could benefit from short-form
registration.220 Consequently, as of January 28, 2008, any company that
has a class of stock listed and registered on a national securities exchange
and has made proper Exchange Act periodic reporting for at least twelve
months immediately preceding the filing of the registration statement is
eligible to utilize short-form registration, as long as sales of securities in
any public offering during the preceding twelve month period do not ex-
ceed one-third of the issuer's public float.221 The Commission estimates
that 1,400 companies will be positively affected by the rule change. 222
The Commission imposed the one-third-of-float cap because "the
greater the magnitude of the offering, the more likely it is that the trans-
action will be transformative to the issuer rather than routine in na-
ture ... [and] exceeding one-third of the value of an issuer's public float
[is] generally of such significance to the issuer that the opportunity for...
a greater window for underwriter due diligence [is] advisable. 223 By this
statement, it appears as though the Commission realizes this amendment
will make a bad situation worse by admitting that the ability to utilize
short-form registration in offerings of less than one-third of public float
"may limit... underwriter involvement in the registration process.., and
may also reduce the time that participating underwriters have to apply
their independent scrutiny and judgment to an issuer's . . . disclosure. ' 22 4
The Commission, at least tacitly, appears willing to trade effective due
diligence for issuer convenience. In fact, the Commission suggests that
the securities exchanges themselves can assist in the underwriting func-
tion "because the exchanges' listing rules and procedures, as well as other
requirements, provide an additional measure of protection for
investors. " 225
IX. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
As this Comment has shown, the securities underwriting and registra-
tion process has changed dramatically over the past seven decades. Tech-
nological and competitive forces have combined to shorten what once
was a process measured in weeks to one not uncommonly measured in
hours. The dynamics involved have changed dramatically as well. Issuers
who once courted "trusted and respected" underwriters to lend an aura
of respectability to their securities offering are now the ones being
courted. Underwriters who once sought and relied on longstanding busi-
ness relationships built on camaraderie and trust are now hawking their
220. Id.
221. Id. at 519-20.
222. Id. at 532.
223. Id. at 521.
224. Id. at 518-19.
225. Id. at 522.
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services with price often the sole differentiator. Well-established lines of
authority now frequently are blurred, with issuers hiring attorneys to re-
present underwriters. Investors, once at the mercy of underwriters and
issuers for the information they deemed important, now instantly have
access to all of the information they need to make an informed and edu-
cated decision. Despite these tremendous changes, the notion that "[n]o
greater reliance in our self-regulatory system is placed on any single par-
ticipant in the issuance of securities than upon the underwriter" is one
immovable force that has remained static throughout this constantly and
rapidly evolving landscape. 226 In other words, due diligence require-
ments have not changed. And that has to change.
Educators and practitioners alike long have agreed that the current ex-
pectations of underwriter due diligence no longer make sense.227 More
than twenty years ago, Donald Langevoort wrote that "once technologi-
cal or other structural changes in the market effectively expand the range
of capital-raising options beyond traditional underwriting, investment
bankers will no longer be gatekeepers. Their economic role thus altered,
the justification for burdening them with due diligence responsibility is
severely undercut. '228 More than a decade later, Professor John Coffee
noted that "it is not clear that the underwriter today still performs the
classic gatekeeping function .... Many argue that serious due diligence
efforts are simply not feasible within the time constraints of shelf registra-
tion. '' 229 Well into the electronic age, Frank Partnoy questioned
"whether the underwriter's 'due diligence' role is justified at all," as "dis-
interested advance due diligence" had become the exception rather than
the rule.2 30 In short, "Congress's assumptions in 1933 and 1934 about
registrants working with individual underwriters in a relatively leisurely
atmosphere are at odds with today's competition by multiple underwrit-
ers for high-speed transactions. '2 31
A major flaw in the accountability theory (under which underwriters-
as gatekeepers-have traditionally found their "power") lies in the man-
ner in which underwriters are rewarded and punished. Since most under-
writers are paid based on a percentage of the per-share offering price, it
follows that they get paid nothing if there is no offering. Like issuers,
underwriters have a strong incentive to "close the deal." However, the
incentive to properly perform the gatekeeping role lies not only in the
"carrot" of commissions, but also in the "stick" of statutory liability.232
226. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir. 1973).
227. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
228. Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778 (1985).
229. John C. Coffee, Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Se-
curities Regulation, 52 Bus. LAW 1195, 1211 (1997).
230. Partnoy, supra note 84, at 522.
231. Letter from ABA Committee on Federal Regulation on Securities, Business Law
Section, to David Martin, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, Re: Securities
Act Reform (Aug. 22, 2001).
232. See Cunningham, supra note 75, at 352-54.
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The investing public is providing the carrot-through a built-in compo-
nent of the offering price-and wielding the stick-through threat of lia-
bility-to the same entity, the underwriter. In many ways, this dual role
of the underwriter makes little sense. As Warren Buffet remarked, "[i]f
I'm going to pay $5 million to somebody if they give me advice and the
deal goes through, then I think I probably ought to pay $5 million to
somebody else whose advice I listen to who gets paid the $5 million only
if the deal doesn't go through. '2 33 It does not follow that these "somebo-
dies" should be the same person. 234 Critics argue that liability-the
"stick"-may make gatekeepers especially risk-adverse and may lead to
an exodus of highly-skilled professionals. 235 "It follows that the advan-
tages of penalties over rewards are less clear-cut for gatekeepers than for
primary wrongdoers. ' ' 236 Nevertheless, the Commission continues to
wield the stick of liability to motivate underwriter due diligence.
Despite such criticisms, the Commission and the courts generally ad-
here to the original positions of the Securities and Exchange Acts con-
cerning due diligence expectations and liability exposure. The Southern
District of New York noted in 2004 that "[t]he underwriter who does not
make a reasonable investigation is derelict in his responsibilities to deal
fairly with the investing public. ' 23 7 What has evolved is an inefficient and
uncomfortable patchwork of state-of-the-art technology, increased com-
petitiveness, and old due diligence standards that has not only proved
ineffective in addressing due diligence ramifications, but also has created
new problems in its own right. Integrated disclosure and shelf registra-
tion have enabled issuers to meet increasingly-fleeting market windows,
but necessarily have decreased the time underwriters have to perform
due diligence. The use of underwriter's counsel has increased the com-
petitiveness within the investment banking world and also has brought
along its own baggage in the form of conflict-of-interest concerns. The
January 2008 revisions to Form S-3 eligibility requirements provide a
faster route to the markets for a greater number of "smaller" companies,
but again at the expense of due diligence. The Commission appears to
want an implausible, if not impossible, combination-the proverbial cake
it can eat-in the form of speed and complete assurance. This approach
is fundamentally flawed because it seeks to hold due diligence standards
as a constant in a rapidly changing marketplace.
The Commission therefore should consider relaxing the due diligence
standard for underwriters in at least some situations. One option would
be to establish due diligence "tiers" based on the size and status of an
233. Id. at 354 (quoting Lawrence Cunningham, Conversations from the Warren Buffet
Symposium, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 766-68 (1997)).
234. Cunningham, supra note 75, at 354.
235. Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1677, 1679 (2007).
236. Id. at 1679.
237. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 662-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(quoting Securities Act Release No. 33-4584 (1963)).
2008] Comment 1659
SMU LAW REVIEW
issuer. For example, the Commission might require that due diligence
standards in an underwriting offering by a "well-known seasoned issuer"
be held only to a recklessness standard. Such an issuer is far more likely
to have made a vast majority of financial and operational information
available to the general public at any time. Moreover, based on the
"fraud on the market" theory, any negative information is built into the
market price of the issuer's securities. This solution is really nothing
more than an extrapolation of Rule 176, which implies that different issu-
ers and offerings may require different due diligence.238
Related is a "market-based" due diligence system, where an under-
writer would "self-tailor" its own due diligence requirements based on
the uniqueness of a transaction.239 This would allow an underwriter to
bind itself to a particular set of due diligence requirements for each indi-
vidual underwriting engagement.240 Over time, a due diligence market-
place would develop, offering different screening procedures, levels of
accuracy, and prices.241 In an efficient market, purchasers, and not the
government, would decide what due diligence exercises are necessary and
how they should be enforced.242
Another option is to allow an underwriter greater reliance on other
experts, such as auditors, in establishing a due diligence defense. This
would permit underwriters to "protect reputation and reduce liability risk
by increasing the effectiveness of their fellow gatekeepers '243 and pro-
vide "sufficient flexibility ... that would enable compensation systems to
channel gains from effective gatekeeping to responsible partners. 244
Such a system would allow underwriters to focus more on enabling the
issuer, but not at the expense of the veracity and completeness of infor-
mation available to investors. This argument was the basis of the under-
writers' motion for summary judgment in WorldCom. The underwriters
argued that they should be able to rely on the financial audits and com-
fort letters provided by the issuer's audit firm and had no reason to inves-
tigate unless they had grounds to doubt the accuracy of the
information.245 Unfortunately, the court rejected this argument, noting
that "underwriters' reliance on audited financial statements may not be
blind . . . [and] where 'red flags' regarding the reliability of an audited
financial statement emerge, mere reliance on an audit will not be suffi-
cient to ward off liability. '246 The underwriters' assertion was that an
audited figure can never raise a "red flag" and trigger a duty of
investigation.247
238. Partnoy, supra note 84, at 541.
239. Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 951 (1998).
240. Id. at 952-53.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. Cunningham, supra note 75, at 372.
244. Id. at 374.
245. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
246. Id. at 672.
247. Id. at 679.
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Holding three parties (the issuer, the underwriter, and the auditor) re-
sponsible for the same piece of information is duplicative, unnecessary,
and expensive. Justice Powell echoed this sentiment in a dissent from the
denial of certiorari in John Nuveen & Co.,248 where he warned that "rec-
ognizing no distinction between the standards of care applicable under
§§ 11 and 12(2), and particularly [] casting doubt upon the reasonable-
ness of relying upon the expertise of certified public accountants '249 po-
tentially "could affect adversely the efficiency of the Nation's short-term
financing markets. '250 Allowing underwriters to rely on experts appropri-
ately would allocate resources by enabling market players to perform
roles for which they are most efficient, while still providing due diligence
protection to investors.
The Commission has taken the position that "[t]he underwriter who
does not make a reasonable investigation is derelict in his responsibilities
to deal fairly with the investing public."' 251 Imposing liability as an af-
firmative defense, rather than an affirmative requirement, almost seems
at odds with this statement. In this vein, some commentators have sug-
gested that Congress replace the affirmative due diligence defense with a
"modified strict liability regime. '252 Under such a plan, underwriters
would be held strictly liable for material misstatements and omissions in
registration statements, but would be allowed to manage their risk
through contract.2 53 Such a scheme would pass savings along to investors
by removing the costs of adjudicating due diligence defenses from the
securities markets.254 Underwriters would still engage in some due dili-
gence (in most cases probably as much as they are able to now), issuers
would still face liability, but competition again would foster motivation
based on reputation.255
Many other solutions to the due diligence problem have been proposed
over the years, and a discussion of each is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. What this Comment attempts to convey, however, is how impor-
tant it is for something to be done. The current system apparently works
only in the collective minds of the Commission.
X. CONCLUSION
The securities registration process is like a game-be it baseball, bas-
ketball, or football. The game has been around for many decades, but the
way the game is played-and the rules under which it is played-have
248. 450 U.S. 1005 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 1011.
250. Id. at 1005-06.
251. In re Richmond Corp., 41 SEC 398 [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. L. Sec. Rep.
(CCH) 76,904 (Feb. 27, 1963).
252. Partnoy, supra note 84, at 540. Interestingly, Congress considered a strict liability
regime in 1933 before compromising on the due diligence affirmative defense. Id.
253. Id. at 546.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 547.
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changed dramatically over the years. In fact, it is sometimes difficult to
tell that it is the same game at all. Unfortunately, because of these con-
stant changes, a major group of players in this game-the underwriters-
are at a decided disadvantage. Although other players frequently have
new equipment and get to play by new, advantageous rules, the under-
writers are stuck with the same old equipment and are subject to the
same old rules, even though the equipment is ineffective and the rules do
not make sense anymore. The underwriters cannot-indeed, will not-
continue to play this game forever. They cannot afford to change the
rules themselves, because the fines are too great if they do. Their only
real alternative is to put down their equipment, walk off the field, and
look for a better game. The problem is that this game really cannot be
played without them. It is time to give the underwriters some new equip-
ment and let them play by new rules. It is time to get the underwriters
back in the game.
